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1 Introduction
This note is based on Ghatak (2000), who studies the optimality of joint liability lending,
of special relevance to the literature on microfinance. There is a growing interest in
microfinance activities. Microfinance institutions aim to reduce poverty by providing
loans to poor women and men without tangible assets, who often live in remote areas
and have been excluded from the formal banking sector. Morduch (1999) estimates that
about 8 to 10 million households are served by microfinance programs. This number is
expected to grow in the near future (Ledgerwood, 1999).
Microfinance institutions rely on unusual lending mechanisms to improve
repayment rates of their clients. One of the innovations, which has attracted most
attention by economists, is the one where borrowers are asked to form groups within the
same village and to make the entire group liable for loans that are given to individual
group members—joint liability lending. A well-known example is the Grameen Bank’s
group lending program. Several authors have emphasized that group lending with joint
liability may lead to peer-monitoring or peer-pressure among group members which
reduces problems of moral hazard and enforcement (Stiglitz, 1990 and Besley and
Coate, 1995). The reason is that a high joint liability component in the debt contract
provides incentives to borrowers to choose the safe investment project. This improves
income for the microfinance institution and subsequently raises utility for the clients
since the increase in income allows a decrease in lending rates.
In a recent contribution to this journal, Ghatak (2000) demonstrates another
advantage of group lending with joint liability. He shows that group lending may lead
to peer-selection, which alleviates problems of adverse selection. The key to this result
is that joint liability contracts induce group members to self-select each other, which
gives banks the possibility to use the joint liability instrument as a screening device. It
can then be shown that in a world of asymmetric information where safe borrowers are
driven out of the market with an individual lending contract, a joint liability contract
may bring these safe borrowers back into the market and so improve social welfare.
The first purpose of this note is to show that joint liability equilibria are never ex post
rational. We show that a borrowing group can effectively pretend to be totally successful
even when some group members have failed. In fact, it will be in their interest to do
so and, there is nothing in the contract that prevents this behavior. In other words, the
lender will never get paid what it had expected and will make negative profits.
This can be used to explain some of the empirical observations made by Morduch
(1999). Morduch states that ”some experts estimate that no more than 1 percent of NGO
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programs worldwide are currently financially sustainable”, and in many microfinance
institutions donor subsidies are needed. This is in apparent contradiction to the Ghatak
result which argues that group lending is Pareto superior to individual lending. We also
show that the Ghatak assumptions implicitly imply that the return on labor should be
sufficiently high to support joint liability contracting.
2 A Property of the Ghatak Model
Ghatak assumes that there are two types of risk neutral agents, who are endowed with
one unit of labor and a risky investment project. The investment project requires a unit of
investment. Entrepreneurs do not have initial wealth, so they cannot self-finance their
projects. Each entrepreneur decides on investing in the project, and therefore raising
funds from outside investors (a bank, or a microfinance institution) or not undertaking
the project. There are safe and risky firms, with probabilities of success ps and pr ,
respectively, where 1 > ps > pr > 0. The proportion of risky firms equals θ . The
outcome of project j, j = s, r is Rj if successful and 0 if unsuccessful. All projects
have the same expected return, i.e., psRs = prRr = R¯. This implies that the projects
differ in risk in the sense of Rotschild and Stiglitz (1970).1 The bank is risk neutral, and
suffers from asymmetric information: the bank only knows the distribution of firms, but
the probability of success is private information.
In an individual liability contract banks offer a standard limited liability debt
contract at a rate of interest r. In a joint liability contract, on the other hand, in addition to
a rate of interest on the own loan, a firm has to pay a joint liability component c, if other
firms fail when it succeeds. Ghatak compares the outcomes under these two possible
types of contracting. The optimal joint liability contracts are derived by assuming that
the bank, like a planner, maximizes a weighted average of the expected utility of both
types of borrowers, subject to its own non-negative profit constraint. He shows that there
exist optimal separating joint liability contracts as well as an optimal pooling contract
that achieve better outcomes than individual liability contracts.
While individual liability contracts may lead to underinvestment, joint liability
contracting can achieve the first-best. Necessary assumptions for a separating
equilibrium and sufficient conditions for a pooling equilibrium are:
R¯ > ρ + µ¯ (1)
1Ghatak also analyses the case where firms only differ with respect to the probability of success so that





ρ + µ¯ (2)
pr + ps ≥ 1 (3)
R¯ > ρ(1 + ps
pr
) (4)
(his equations A1, A2, A3 and A4, respectively) where ρ is the opportunity cost
of capital per loan, µ¯ is the opportunity cost of labor (return on labor) and p¯ =
θpr + (1 − θ)ps.
Equation (1) guarantees that both types of projects are socially productive, and
therefore should be undertaken for an optimal outcome from a social point of view.
Equation (3) rules out contracts with negative interest rates. Equation (2) implies that the
participation constraint for safe firms is not satisfied with an individual liability contract.
This implies that under individual liability contracting, there is adverse selection leading
to a sub-optimal outcome characterized by underinvestment. Finally, equation (4) is a
feasibility constraint for joint liability in the sense that, it guarantees that a successful
firm has enough to pay both individual and joint liability commitments.
In a separating equilibrium, Ghatak argues that safe firms and risky firms form
separate groups. Given psRs = prRr = R¯, and ps > pr, it follows that Rs < Rr.
With safe firms going together, if a successful safe firm can honor its individual and
joint liability commitments in a joint liability contract, it becomes easier for the group
of risky firms to do the same since Rr > Rs. Ghatak argues that for separating equilibria,
feasibility in the case of safe firms is sufficient for the feasibility for the risky group(s).
Indeed, as Ghatak goes on to show (in his Proposition 3), if (4) is not satisfied, a
separating equilibrium does not exist, but a pooling equilibrium does if the following





where β ≡ [θp2r + (1 − θ)p2s ]/[psp¯] ∈ (0, 1).
3 Implications
There are two types of equilibria — separating and pooling contracts. In a pooling
contract, the optimal individual and joint liabilities per unit of loan are, respectively:







Observe that, since pr < 1 and ps ≤ 1, it follows that rˆ < cˆ. Consider a two person
group. When one fails, the other has to pay her own rˆ plus cˆ because her partner has
failed. It is in her interest to transfer an amount rˆ to her failed partner who can then pay
the lender this amount, pretending to have been successful. The two partners together
can then generate a surplus cˆ − rˆ , and hence, it will be in their interest to do so. While
signing the contract, i.e., ex ante, the bank, expected to get
θ[rˆ + cˆ(1 − pr)]pr + (1 − θ)[rˆ + cˆ(1 − ps)]ps − ρ = 0 (8)
which is equation (3c) in Ghatak. However, ex post, the bank gets
θ[rˆ + rˆ(1 − pr)]pr + (1 − θ)[rˆ + rˆ(1 − ps)]ps − ρ < 0
For the separating contract, a similar argument holds because for the group with safe
firms only, rs < rˆ < cˆ < cs, where the liabilities on the safe firms in the separating
contract are rs and cs (Ghatak (2000), p. 615).
Thus, in both cases, the lender will make a loss and, hence, will need to be
subsidised. This could be the reason why most microfinance institutions are financially
supported with donor subsidies.
In addition, one can derive the following properties of the equilibria.
Proposition 1: Suppose there exists separating joint liability equilibrium contracts,
when individual contracting is sub-optimal. Then, the opportunity cost of labor must
exceed the opportunity cost of capital.
Proof: Given the conditions in the Proposition, we know that equations (1) - (4) hold.
For proving the Proposition, we will argue that (2) and (4) together imply that µ¯ > ρ.
Equations (2) and (4) imply that
ρ(1 + ps
pr
































r + (1 − θ)p2s
θp2r + (1 − θ)prps
> 1,
one must have µ¯ > ρ.
Proposition 2: Suppose there exists a pooling joint liability equilibrium and a
separating equilibrium is not feasible, when individual contracting is sub-optimal.
Then, the opportunity cost of labor must be positive.
Proof: Here, we know that instead of (4), we have (5) along with equations (1)-(3).
Equations (2) and (5) together imply the following:
ps
p¯
ρ + βµ¯ < R¯ < ps
p¯
ρ + µ¯
Observe that if µ¯ = 0, this is never possible.
In most poor countries, where microfinance is considered as an instrument for
reducing poverty, one expects the opportunity cost of labor to be very low. Most of the
poor in these countries operate in depressed labor markets where they get low wages.
Indian data suggest that the poor cannot afford to be unemployed and work at more than
one job to make ends meet. The reason for their poverty is not lack of jobs, but lack of
well-paying jobs (Gangopadhyay and Wadhwa, 1999). And, if they were poor because
they are unemployed, then their opportunity cost by definition is zero! So, it is difficult
to explain how the success of group lending among the poor should depend on a lower
bound on the opportunity cost of labor.
However, the success of the Bangladesh Grameen Bank may have a clue to this
apparent anomaly. This Bank has the village women as its members. In most
developing countries, while the market value for female labor is very low, their utility
as (non-marketable) household labor is very high. Women enter the labor market
only when the wage being offered is sufficiently large. If one reinterprets Ghatak’s
opportunity cost of labor as the reservation utility level of the women, one can justify
the high µ¯.
The question then is, what sort of poor economic agents in backward villages
will have low valued marketable labor, but high-valued household (or non-marketable)
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labor? If abject poverty is the issue, then it is unlikely that individuals will give more
personal value to household labor and less to the nominal wages obtainable from the
labor market, even when these wages are very low. It is, therefore, difficult to see why
joint liability contracting should be treated as part of a poverty alleviation program. The
fact that µ¯ must be sufficiently high gives theoretical credibility to the empirical finding
that it is the ”better off” poor rather than the ”starkly” poor, who stand to benefit most
from such programs (Morduch, 1999; Hulme and Mosley, 1996).
Some argue that there is too much emphasis on financial sustainability of
microfinance group lending programs (Morduch, 1999). In the Ghatak framework,
equation (1) guarantees that it is always socially optimal to finance both risky and safe
firms. With equation (2) holding, one has market failure due to adverse selection. It
is, therefore, easy to see why intervention is needed. Given the problem with ex post
rationality, we see that a subsidy has to be given even for joint liabilities. However, it
can be shown that in this model, one can always solve for a subsidy to capital, such that
individual liabilities will achieve the first best.
Therefore, there is nothing special in the joint liabilities program. First, it cannot
target the really poor, those with low µ¯. Second, it needs subsidies, anyway. This brings
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